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#2A-2/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LAKE CITY POLICE CLUB, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CITY OF OSWEGO, 
Respondent. 
BLITMAN AND KING (CHARLES E. BLITMAN, ESQ. and 
JOHN L. VALENTINO, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (WILLIAM M. 
WALLENS, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Lake City 
Police Club (Club) to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
decision which dismissed the Club's charge against the City of 
Oswego (City) as untimely pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of our Rules 
of Procedure, which creates a four-month filing period. 
The Club charged that the City unilaterally implemented new 
procedures for the receipt of benefits under General Municipal 
Law (GML) §207-c in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). After a hearing, which was 
limited to the timeliness issue, the ALJ dismissed the charge, 
finding that the time within which the new procedures could be 
challenged began to run in April 1988 when the City's police 
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chief, William Ruggio, gave a copy of the new GML §2 07-c 
procedures and a cover memorandum stating that they had been 
"adopted" to the Club's president, Lundy. Ruggio also told Lundy 
that same date that the City was "going to start using" these new 
~ proeeduygs—f'o^ 
respond after the procedures were reviewed by the Club's 
attorney. Ruggio also asked Lundy to distribute copies of the 
procedures at the Club meeting scheduled that night. Lundy told 
him he would not and he neither distributed nor mentioned the 
procedures to his membership. 
Lundy's statements to Ruggio were the Club's only response 
on the issue until December 1988. The Club maintains that it was 
J not until then, when a unit employee complained to it that he had 
] been ordered to appear at a benefits eligibility hearing, that it 
knew that the new procedures had been implemented. The Club, 
which by this point was represented by different counsel, then 
advised the City in writing that it did not consent to the 
changes and, thereafter, it filed this charge. 
The Club excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the City's 
announcement and implementation of the change in procedures 
i 
occurred simultaneously. It argues that Ruggio's comments to 
I Lundy were future-oriented and, therefore, he did not know that 
the procedures were being implemented effective with their 
announcement in April 1988. The Club would run the four-month 
limitations period from the date in December 1988 when the unit 
Board - U-10613 
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employee told the Club that he was instructed to report to the 
benefits eligibility hearing. 
For the reasons which follow, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
We are persuaded that the exchange between Ruggio and Lundy in 
Apr^ i-1—lr98-8^ wh~en—r^ ^^  
new procedures were then in effect, to be applied when next an 
application for GML §207-c benefits was made. The City did not 
simply announce an action that would perhaps occur only at some 
future, unspecified date as the Club would have us hold. 
As we view the record, the circumstances surrounding the 
conversation between Lundy and Ruggio are not materially 
different from those in Hauppauqe UFSD, 17 PERB 14504, affd, 
17 PERB 13051 (1984) , conf 'd, Hauppauqe Teachers Association v. 
PERB, 116 A.D. 2d 816, 19 PERB 17001 (3d Dep't 1986), motion for 
leave to appeal denied, 67 N.Y.2d 607, 19 PERB 17012 (1986), in 
which we also dismissed improper practice allegations as untimely 
because the employer had told the union what it was "going to do" 
more than four months before the charge was filed. 
Although we believe that the record shows that Lundy 
understood in April 1988 that the new GML §207-c procedures were 
then in effect, we need only conclude that he reasonably should 
have known that from his exchange with Ruggio. Therefore, those 
facts which the Club relies upon to evidence that Lundy did not 
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actually know that the procedures were effective in April-i/ 
become immaterial. 
The Club also seeks to draw an inference adverse to the City 
from its declination to call Ruggio as a witness in its behalf. 
-N-eP^a^verrs^=i-n?f^r:eWee^e^ 
this respect because there was no material fact in dispute 
regarding the timeliness issue. Ruggio's testimony in relevant 
respect would have been cumulative only. 
The Club also argues that the ALT's decision is inconsistent 
with our decision in Middle Country Teachers Association 
(Werner) , 21 PERB ^3012 (1988) . We agree, however, with the 
ALJ's assessment that a dismissal of this charge in these 
circumstances is entirely consistent with Middle Country. In 
Middle Country, charging parties were given an option of bringing 
a charge within four months of either notification or of 
injury/implementation. In the context of a unilateral change 
allegation, the legal injury is to the union only, and injury/ 
implementation occurs when the change is made. Nothing in Middle 
Country suggests that notification cannot coincide with injury/ 
implementation, and that is the factual situation here, although 
the two need not and often will not. For example, an employer 
•i/The Club argues, for example, that Lundy would have informed 
the membership about the new procedures if he knew they were in 
effect as of April 1988. It also cites Lundy's letter of 
December 13, 1988 to the City, in which he states that the Club's 
attorney has reviewed "what I believe to be the City's proposed 
procedures." 
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may give notice on December 1 of a change to be effective January 
1. Under Middle Country, a union could timely file a refusal to 
bargain charge resting upon a unilateral change allegation within 
four months of either December 1, the notification date, or 
^-airoaxy=4IFr^t-He~i^ 
is not first affected until more than four months after January 
1, the union is not again then injured such that a charge is 
rendered timely if brought within four months of application to 
the unit employee. That interpretation would give a charging 
party minimally three dates from which to file a charge,, a result 
not sanctioned even under Middle Country's liberalized filing 
requirements. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ»s decision is affirmed and 
IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Memtfer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
--^ and^ - — -"" 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ. and 
MIGUEL ORTIZ, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
HAROLD, SALANT, COMER, STRASSFIELD and SPIELBERG, 
ESQS. (CHRISTOPHER J. HAROLD, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on the exceptions of the 
Westchester County Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
(WCCSEA) and the cross-exceptions of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
which upheld in part and dismissed in part CSEA's charges 
alleging, as amended, that since February 1989, WCCSEA had 
interfered with CSEA's rights as the recognized negotiating 
agent for a large unit of employees of the County of 
Westchester (County) in violation of §209-a.2(a) of the 
CASE^NO^^U^lr088^F 
& U-11114 
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Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Central to the charges as filed, litigated and decided 
is whether CSEA or WCCSEA was the recognized bargaining agent 
because the parties concede that WCCSEA cannot violate the 
dates. In that respect, the ALJ found, after analyzing in 
detail the evidence regarding the parties' bargaining 
history, that although WCCSEA was recognized in 1968, CSEA 
was recognized by the County in 1977, and retained that 
status to relevant date. Of the several stated grounds of 
interference, the ALJ concluded that all but one constituted 
WCCSEA's privileged articulation of opinion regarding its 
-' status as the bargaining agent and a correct statement of the 
statutory rights and duties flowing from that status if 
possessed. The ALJ held, however, that WCCSEA violated §209-
a.2(a) of the Act when it negotiated a sick leave benefit 
with the County because negotiations over terms and 
conditions of employment of unit employees per se interfered 
with the unit employees' right to be represented exclusively 
by CSEA. 
WCCSEA's exceptions are directed only to the ALT's 
finding regarding the identity of the bargaining agent since 
1977. It urges that the ALJ erred when he concluded that 
J 
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there was an effective change in recognition from WCCSEA to 
CSEA in 1977 and when he concluded that CSEA retained that 
status. CSEA argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that 
WCCSEA was recognized at any time, by excluding evidence 
xegai?d±ng^ recogni.-ti-Q^ ^^  
from other employers and by dismissing all but one of the 
stated grounds of interference. CSEA stipulates, however, 
that its cross-exceptions need not be addressed unless merit 
is found in any of WCCSEA's exceptions. 
The parties' exceptions compel an examination of the 
ALJ's findings of fact and we have carefully reviewed the 
record on which they are based. Having done so, we are in 
[ ) agreement with his determination that much of the record 
evidence regarding the identity of the bargaining agent is 
unclear, inconsistent or indeterminative. We find no reason 
to disturb his finding that CSEA was recognized in 1977, 
I which rests substantially on a credibility assessment of the 
i 
j County's Director of Labor Relations, Michael Wittenberg, who 
testified that the County intentionally recognized CSEA as 
the unit representative that year.-^/ 
-i/ln view of this finding, it is unnecessary for us to decide 
the identity of the bargaining agent for the period 1968 to 
1977. 
Board - U-10884/11114 -4 
We further find no merit in WCCSEA's argument that the 
change in recognition was not properly effected. The issue 
as presented is whether there was in fact a change in 
recognition in favor of CSEA in 1977 and whether CSEA has 
~s4-nee—l~orstF^ el-a^ -m—t^ ^^  
change in recognition was properly effected, that issue is 
not now properly before us. 
The ALJ also concluded that WCCSEA failed to establish 
that it recaptured its former status after 1977. A change in 
the recognized bargaining agent must be both intentional and 
consensual.-2-/ We find no persuasive evidence of either 
element on this record and, therefore, we conclude that CSEA 
retained its status as bargaining agent. 
As neither party has filed exceptions to the violation 
found by the ALJ, we do not consider any issues associated 
with that finding. Similarly, pursuant to CSEA's 
stipulation, we do not address its cross-exceptions. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's finding 
that WCCSEA violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act when it 
negotiated a sick leave benefit provision with the County. 
^/see Village of Sloatsburg, 20 PERB f3011 (1987). 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that WCCSEA cease and desist 
from interfering with, restraining or coercing public 
employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act or 
from causing or attempting to cause the County to do so.-2-/ 
DATED: February 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Menfoer 
•2/The ALJ did not order a recision of the sick leave 
agreement or a posting and no exceptions were filed to his 
remedial order. Although we may review the remedial order on 
our own motion in such circumstances (see §204.14(c) of the 
Rules of Procedure), there is no reason for us to disturb the 
ALJ's recommended order. 
#2C-2/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATRICE LOMUSCIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9563 & 
•z^z^^^ U^T01X8 
METROPOLITAN SUBURBAN BUS AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
LEWIS, GREENWALD, KENNEDY, LEWIS, CLIFTON & 
SCHWARTZ, P.C. (ARTHUR Z. SCHWARTZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
CINDY L. DUGAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Patrice Lomuscio excepts to the dismissal, after hearing, of 
her improper practice charges against the Metropolitan Suburban 
Bus Authority (MSBA). The assigned Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) found that Lomuscio, a bus operator with MSBA, failed to 
meet her burden of proving that the MSBA violated §§209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it disciplined her for insubordination and for disruption of 
service. 
The facts giving rise to the instant charges are as follows. 
Lomuscio made a claim, on April 27, 1987, that the brakes on her 
bus were "long". Upon return to the depot and testing of the 
brakes, it was determined that the brakes worked within the 
safety standard established by the Public Safety Transportation 
Board - U-9563 & U-10118 -2 
Board. Disciplinary charges were thereafter filed against 
Lomuscio, charging her with disruption of service and falsifying 
a breakdown. During a meeting in connection with the grievance, 
Lomuscio threatened litigation against her supervisor for 
harassment and a second disciplinary notice was issued, seeking 
Lomuscio's termination for insubordination. Subsequently, the 
charge alleging falsification of a breakdown was withdrawn by the 
MSBA, and, on appeal to arbitration, the arbitrator sustained the 
remaining consolidated charges but reduced the proposed penalty 
to a six-day suspension. 
The second incident which is the subject of these charges 
occurred on January 26, 19 88, when Lomuscio complained of fumes 
) in the passenger compartment of her bus. She was sent to the 
hospital for a physical examination, and advised to take the rest 
of the day off, which was granted with pay. However, the 
maintenance department investigated Lomuscio's complaint of fumes 
in the passenger compartment but found no evidence of fumes or 
defects, and a warning notice thereupon issued for disruption of 
service. No grievance was filed in connection with the warning 
notice. 
In essence, Lomuscio asserts that the disciplinary actions 
taken against her constitute retaliation for the exercise of her 
rights to complain of safety defects on the buses she is expected 
to drive, and to threaten litigation for harassment and 
discrimination against her for her participation in the employee 
) organizational activity of rigorously pursuing safety claims, an 
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activity supported and encouraged by Lomuscio's bargaining agent. 
The ALT deemed it unnecessary to determine whether Lomuscio 
was engaged in activity protected by the Act, because she 
concluded that legitimate business reasons existed for the 
imposition of discipline against Lomuscio. She accordingly 
dismissed the charge. 
In her exceptions to the ALJ decision, Lomuscio asserts, 
among other things, that the AKT erred in failing to make a 
finding that Lomuscio *s activities were protected by the Act when 
she filed defect claims and threatened to sue her supervisor for 
harassment; that disciplinary action was taken against her in 
retaliation for the exercise of her protected activity; and that 
) no legitimate business reason could be found to justify the 
imposition of discipline in the absence of evidence of bad faith 
conduct on the part of Lomuscio in filing claims (not present 
here). 
We agree with the charging party that the analysis and 
disposition of this case must begin with a determination whether 
Lomuscio was engaged in activity protected by the Act when she 
filed complaints of defects on the buses assigned to her and when 
she threatened to sue her supervisor for harassment. Only if we 
find that these activities are protected would it be necessary to 
decide whether the fact that Lomuscio's defect claims in the 
Board - U-9563 & U-10118 -4 
instances at issue were unsubstantiated upon investigation-^/ 
renders otherwise protected activity unprotected, or whether a 
showing of bad faith filing of claims in these instances is 
required to obviate a finding of violation of the Act. 
In Rosen V. PERB, 21 PERB 57014, 72 N.Y.2d 42 (1988), the 
Court of Appeals examined the scope of application of the 
protections of §2 09-a.l of the Act to an individual employee not 
acting in the context of joining or participating in an employee 
organization. The Court found that "the Taylor Law was not 
intended to protect unorganized — though concerted — activity. 
Having concluded that petitioner and the other teachers had not 
formed, or sought to form, an employee organization, and had not 
exercised any right guaranteed by §202, PERB correctly determined 
that the college therefore did not commit an improper employer 
practice within the meaning of §2 09-a.l." 21 PERB at 7 021. The 
Court of Appeals has thus clearly established that the 
protections of the Act apply only in cases of adverse action 
arising out of participation in employee organizational activity. 
Section 2 09-a.l of the Act provides, in pertinent part: 
It shall be an improper practice for a public 
employer or its agents deliberately (a) to interfere 
with, restrain or coerce public employees in the 
exercise of their rights guaranteed in [§202] for the 
purpose of depriving them of such rights; . . . [or] 
(c) to discriminate against any employee for the 
purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in, 
or participation in the activities of, any employee 
organization. . . . 
i/The factual finding made by the arbitrator in the 
disciplinary arbitration that the charges were supported by 
the evidence is adopted for the purpose of our decision. 
Board - U-9563 & U-10118 -5 
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 ) 
Section 202 of the Act provides: 
Public employees shall have the right to form, 
join and participate in, or to refrain from forming, 
joining, or participating in, any employee organization 
of their own choosing. 
Sections 202 and 209-a.l, when read together, provide that 
a^—employee—is—engaTg^ 
engaged in the activities of an employee organization. At issue 
before us in the instant case is whether the filing of bus defect 
claims and the threat of litigation against a supervisor 
constitutes an employee organizational activity. 
The record establishes that Lomuscio's employee 
organization, the Transport Workers Union, Local 252 (TWU), had 
placed a sign on a union bulletin board which states: "Write all 
^ defects on buses, pay particular attention to brakes. Hank Eulo, 
Tony Christopher." However, MSBA witnesses testified that it is 
the employer's policy to require its bus operators to file 
written defect claims, with particular emphasis on brakes and 
steering. Indeed, Lomuscio testified that the MSBA operator's 
handbook requires operators to file defect cards as part of their 
job responsibilities. 
Finally, Lomuscio testified to her reasons for filing a 
defect card as follows: 
Q. You are a union representative, Ms. Lomuscio? 
A. No. 
Q. When you filed the defect card on the 2 0th, 
were you doing that on behalf of any of the 
members of your union? 
) 
J 
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A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. I am just asking, was it a personal reason? 
A. Was I influenced by anybody? 
Q. Was it a personal decision of yours to do 
that? Was it your individual decision? 
A". r^don-'-^know—whatF^-— ' 
Q. Let me try to rephrase it. When 
you filed the long brake defect 
card, were you doing it in your 
capacity, in any capacity as a 
representative of your union? 
A. The reason why I was doing it was because the 
bus was unsafe. 
Indeed, Lomuscio never testified that she filed the defect 
cards giving rise to disciplinary charges and a warning notice 
against her because of any employee organizational campaign or 
activity in which she was engaged. 
2/ 
She testified instead that 
she considered the filing of defect cards to be part of her 
responsibility as a bus operator. Nor were the filings made 
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the TWU 
and the MSBA, which is silent on the subject of filing defect 
cards. Similarly, she offered no testimony or other evidence 
that her threat to pursue litigation was prompted or encouraged 
by or made pursuant to any TWU policy 
or the collective bargaining agreement. 
-^Lomuscio's only testimony concerning connection of her 
claims to the TWU is that she was aware of the sign on the 
union bulletin board, and that she had expressed concern to a 
union representative that her frequent filing of defect 
claims might cause her problems. She testified that the 
union representative responded that she was doing her job and 
should continue to do so. 
Board - U-9563 & U-10118 
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In New York City Transit Authority (Alston^
 r 20 PERB [^3065 
(1987), this Board held that the distribution of material 
protesting disciplinary action by the employer to bargaining unit 
members and union officials constituted an attempt to communicate 
with—and gain- assistance -from the bargaining- unit and its , 
representatives in connection with the disciplinary action under 
review pursuant to the grievance procedure contained in a 
collective bargaining agreement. We held such activity to 
constitute participation in employee organizational activity 
protected by the Act. In contrast, the record here falls short 
of establishing that Lomuscio's filing of defect cards or threat 
of litigation was pursuant to an employee organizational campaign 
or pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement authorizing 
and/or encouraging such actions. We therefore conclude that 
Lomuscio's filings, in this instance, did not constitute activity 
protected by the Act. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
•&ty~-*Cj2^H-
/ Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
T.7— 1 4 . J - T 
iiaj.uSi. J_I. 
EricyO". Schmertz, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- CASF;^NQS^.^U^8:8^g^^ 
-and- & U-8876 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION), 
Respondent. 
JAMES P. KEMENASH, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD J. 
DAUTNER, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the State 
of New York (Department of Transportation) (DOT) and the 
cross-exception of the Public Employees Federation (PEF) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) which found 
that DOT had violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees1 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally increasing the 
workweek of motor vehicle inspectors and Civil Engineer lis 
functioning as bridge inspectors from 37% to 40 hours a week. 
DOT excepts to the ALJ's failure to find that provisions of 
its 1985 collective bargaining agreement with PEF control the 
issue presented herein and divest the Board of jurisdiction. 
i Additionally, DOT argues that, absent the applicability of 
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the negotiated agreement, Civil Service Law and Attendance 
Rules control the disposition of the instant dispute; that 
PEF waived its right to bargain a change in the workweek; and 
that the ALJ misapplied the Board's decision in City of Mount 
^elrlron1^!^^^^^ 
inspectors. Finally, DOT argues that, should the Board 
sustain the finding of an improper practice, compensatory 
time off, rather than back pay and interest, is the 
appropriate remedy. 
PEF's sole exception is to the ruling that its amendment 
to the improper practice charge is untimely. 
Based on the parties' stipulation of June 29, 1987, and 
./ the record of the proceeding before the ALJ, the facts are as 
follows. DOT is responsible for the periodic inspection of 
bridges and of buses operated by private carriers. It 
employs bridge inspection teams consisting of individuals in 
various titles. Employees in both the bridge and motor 
vehicle inspection units are field employees within the 
State's Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 
bargaining unit (PS&T unit). 
PEF, the duly-certified bargaining agent for employees 
in the PS&T unit, entered into a collective agreement with 
DOT covering that unit's employees for a term from April 1, 
1985 through March 31, 1988. In negotiations that led to 
that contract, DOT had failed to get an agreement 
J 
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incorporating into Article 32, entitled "Workweek and 
Workday", a statement establishing "a standard workweek of 40 
hours for all employees". In relevant part, Article 32 
provides as follows: 
^^^^^^^^^^—3-2^rl——Except—fn—the—case—of—shrf t r 
operations the normal workweek of full-
time State employees who are not employed 
on a seasonal or field basis shall 
consist of five consecutive days with two 
consecutive days off. Such days shall be 
Monday through Friday and the working day 
shall commence between 6:00 a.m. and 
10:00 a.m. In the case of full-time 
employees employed, other than on a 
seasonal basis, in facilities where shift 
work is required, the workweek, wherever 
practicable and consistent with program 
needs, shall consist of five consecutive 
working days separated by two consecutive 
days off. 
32.2 Within 90 days of the execution 
of this Agreement, State departments and 
agencies shall prepare and furnish to the 
Governor's Office of Employee Relations 
and the President of PEF a written 
statement of workweeks or workdays in 
such departments which on the date of 
this Agreement differ from the normal 
workweek or workday. The workweek and 
workday established pursuant to this 
Article shall not be changed without the 
consent of the employees affected, except 
in an emergency, without reasonable 
advance notice and consultation. 
Employees affected by the change, except 
in emergencies, shall be provided with a 
minimum of 3 0 days' written notice prior 
to the effective date of the change. 
) 
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Until May 20, 1985, the standard workweek for all motor 
vehicle inspectors employed by DOT had been 37^ hours per 
week. However, motor vehicle inspectors appointed after 
May 20, 1985 were required to work a standard week of 4 0 
the ALJ, approximately 24 new motor vehicle inspectors were 
appointed and worked a 4 0-hour workweek. 
DOT has deployed bridge inspection teams within 11 
regions. Inspectors in region 6 have worked a 4 0-hour 
workweek since the inception of bridge inspection work in 
that region. Inspectors in regions 10 and 11 have worked a 
37^-hour workweek throughout the relevant time in question. 
/ Inspectors in regions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, having previously 
worked at 37^-hour week, were required to begin working a 
40-hour workweek on August 14, 1985. The bridge inspection 
team in region 2 worked a 37^-hour week from the team's 
inception, on May 17, 1984, to June 15, 1984, when a 40-hour 
workweek was commenced. The bridge inspection team in region 
9 worked a 37^-hour week from its inception, in May or June, 
1984, to September 20, 1984,' when it began a 40-hour 
workweek. 
On September 25, 1985, a PEF representative wrote to 
DOT's Director of Employee Relations asking whether DOT had 
increased the workweek from 37^ to 40 hours for bridge 
inspectors and new employees in the motor vehicle series. 
^ 
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The letter further advised that, if this were the case, the 
matter should be negotiated. After PEF sent a number of 
other letters urging a response to its letter of 
September 25, 1985, the parties had a meeting on May 1, 198 6. 
At—the^May—meeting^—^ 
employees in the title of motor vehicle inspectors had been 
required to work 40 hours per week since May 20, 1985. DOT 
also advised PEF at that meeting that all bridge inspectors 
had been directed to work a 4 0-hour week. PEF demanded that 
DOT bargain these changes, but, when it received no response 
to its bargaining demand, filed the instant two improper 
practice charges with PERB. 
J In Case No. U-8875, PEF charged that DOT violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act by unilaterally changing the workweek 
of newly-hired motor vehicle inspectors from 37^ hours to 4 0 
hours. In Case No. U-8876, PEF alleged that DOT unilaterally 
increased the workweek of Civil Engineer lis who functioned 
as bridge inspectors from 37^ hours to 4 0 hours. Less than a 
month after the charges were filed, PEF filed an amendment to 
its charge in Case No. U-8876 by adding the titles of Civil 
Engineer I, Principal Engineering Technician, Senior 
Engineering Technician and Engineering Technician to that of 
Civil Engineer II as those affected by DOT'S unilateral 
increase in the workweek of bridge inspectors. DOT filed 
answers to the charges and an amended answer, claiming that 
.J 
Board - U-8875 & U-8876 -6 
I 
o 
PEF's amendment was untimely. These matters went to hearing 
on August 11, 1987. 
; In his decision, the ALJ found that Article 3 2 of the 
i i 
| parties' agreement does not, contrary to DOT'S argument, 
ggyg-^z^j^e^qiiatfee^g^al^^ssue^so—as—to—dd-ve-s^^PERB—of " ^~" 
jurisdiction. He also rejected the remainder of DOT'S 
defenses. With respect to PEF's amendment in Case No. 
U-8876, the ALJ found that it was untimely. On these bases, 
the ALJ concluded that DOT violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act by 
unilaterally increasing the workweek of motor vehicle 
inspectors and Civil Engineer lis functioning as bridge 
j inspectors from 37% to 40 hours. 
) We reverse the ALJ with respect to his finding that the 
amendment to the charge in Case No. U-8876 is untimely but, 
i on the grounds set forth in his decision, sustain the ALJ's 
findings in all other respects. 
As to the amendment, we find that it was limited to the 
identity of those who would be entitled to relief in the 
event the charge were sustained. In no other respects were 
the factual bases of the improper practice charge, as 
I originally filed, altered by the amendment. Furthermore, 
there was no prejudice to DOT in responding to the amended 
charge. The hearing occurred almost a year from the date the 
proposed amendment was filed and DOT'S litigation addressed 
the newly-identified parties. Accordingly, we will allow the 
J 
I 
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amendment. 
We note that in another, earlier case, an ALJ arrived at 
the same conclusion where the amendment did not alter the 
alleged violation, but involved only "the identity of those 
rcfrQ-^ml-ght^be—entl-t-1-ed—to—re-l-ief-.-7^.-.^J^^Add^ti^o^a^^^sHpport 
for our conclusion is found in the Civil Practice Law and 
Rules (CPLR). While the CPLR is not binding on PERB, 
reference to it is instructive as to procedural issues before 
us. CPLR §203(e) provides: 
Claim in amended pleading. A claim 
asserted in an amended pleading is deemed 
to have been interposed at the time the 
claims in the original pleading were 
interposed, unless the original pleading 
does not give notice of the transactions, 
[ ) occurrences, or series of transactions or 
occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the 
amended pleading. 
! Clearly, in the instant case, the transactions and 
occurrences in question in both the charge and the amended 
charge are identical. 
Finally, we find no merit in DOT'S argument that 
compensatory time off, rather than backpay with interest, is 
i 
the appropriate remedy for those harmed by its increase in 
the workweek. DOT bases its argument on §135.11 of the 
Budget Director's Rules and Regulations: 
-^County of Nassau, 8 PERB ?[4546, at 4644, n. 5 (1974). 
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Compensatory time off. (a) Eligible 
officers and employees whose basic work 
schedule is less than 40 hours per 
workweek shall be entitled to 
compensatory time off on a straight-time 
basis for overtime worked in excess of 
37h hours but not in excess of 40 hours 
in a workweek. 
We find this section inapplicable to the circumstances before 
us which involve an unlawful increase in the straight-time 
workweek and not any issue of overtime work. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that DOT violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally increased from 
37^ to 40 hours the workweek of motor vehicle inspectors and 
of those who hold the titles of Civil Engineer I and Civil 
Engineer II, Principal Engineering Technician, Senior 
Engineering Technician and Engineering Technician and who 
function as bridge inspectors. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State (Department of 
Transportation): 
(1) Forthwith rescind its requirement that motor 
vehicle inspectors hired after May 20, 1985 work a 
4 0-hour workweek and compensate them at their 
applicable rate of pay, plus interest at the 
maximum legal rate for 2\ hours of work per week 
from their date of hire until their workweek is 
reduced to 37^ hours; 
Board - U-8875 & U-8876 
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(2) Forthwith rescind its requirement that those who 
hold the titles of Civil Engineer I, Civil 
Engineer II, Principal Engineering Technician, 
I Senior Engineering Technician and Engineering 
I 
=1 -T-echTid-ciaTi^ aiid^ who—ad-so—function—as—br-idge 
I 
inspectors in DOT regions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 work 
4 0 hours per week, and compensate them for 2\ hours 
of work per week at their applicable rate of pay, 
plus interest at the maximum legal rate, from 
August 14, 1985, until their workweek is reduced to 
31 h hours; 
(3) Forthwith rescind its requirement that those who 
hold the titles of Civil Engineer I, Civil Engineer 
II, Principal Engineering Technician, Senior 
Engineering Technician and Engineering Technician 
and who also function as bridge inspectors in DOT 
region 2 work 4 0 hours per week, and compensate 
them for 2\ hours of work per week at their 
applicable rate of pay, plus interest at the 
maximum legal rate, from June 15, 1984, until their 
workweek is reduced to 37% hours; 
! (4) Forthwith rescind its requirement that those who 
, hold the titles of Civil Engineer I, Civil Engineer 
i 
II, Principal Engineering Technician, Senior 
Engineering Technician and Engineering Technician 
j 
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and who also function as bridge inspectors in DOT 
region 9 work 4 0 hours per week, and compensate 
them for 2\ hours of work per week at their 
applicable rate of pay, plus interest at the 
maximum—l-ega^ ^^ ra-t^ ^^ fr-om—g:eptembe~r^ 2^0-7-^ 1^-984^ ,^ u^^ ta-l~ ' — ~ 
their workweek is reduced to 31\ hours; 
(5) Negotiate in good faith with PEF; 
(6) Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to 
the affected DOT unit employees. 
DATED: February 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member < 
APPENDIX 
10TICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
hereby notify
 a n employees in the unit represented by the- Public 
Employees Federation that the State of New York (Department of 
Transportation) will: 
(1) Not require that motor vehicle inspectors hired 
after May 20, 1985 work a 40-hour workweek and will compensate them 
at their applicable rate of pay, plus interest at the maximum legal 
rate for 2\ hours of work per week from their date of hire until 
their workweek is reduced to 2,1\ hours; 
(2) Not require that those who hold the titles of 
Civil Engineer I, Civil Engineer II, Principal Engineering 
Technician, Senior Engineering Technician and Engineering 
Technician and who also function as bridge inspectors in DOT 
regions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 work 40 hours per week, and will 
compensate them for 2\ hours of work per week at their applicable 
rate of pay, plus interest at the maximum legal rate, from August 
14, 1985, until their workweek is reduced to 37'h hours; 
(3) Not require that those who hold the titles of 
Civil Engineer I, Civil Engineer II, Principal Engineering 
Technician, Senior Engineering Technician and Engineering 
Technician and who also function as bridge inspectors in DOT region 
2 work 4 0 hours per week, and will compensate them for 2\ hours of 
work per week at their applicable rate of pay, plus interest at the 
maximum legal rate, from June 15, 1984, until their workweek is 
reduced to 37^ hours; 
(4) Not require that those who hold the titles of 
Civil Engineer I, Civil Engineer II, Principal Engineering 
Technician, Senior Engineering Technician and Engineering 
Technician and who also function as bridge inspectors in DOT region 
9 work 40 hours per week, and will compensate them for 2\ hours of 
work per week at their applicable rate of pay, plus interest at the 
maximum legal rate, from September 20, 1984, until their workweek 
is reduced to 37^ hours; 
(E\ Neaotiate in aood faith with the Public Employees 
#3A-2/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SEWANHAKA PROFESSIONAL NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO.--C-3-56-1-—-
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sewanhaka Professional 
Nurses Association has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Registered professional nurses working in 
school nursing. 
Excluded: Nurse/teacher and all other employees. 
Certification - C-3561 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Sewanhaka Professional 
Nurses Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
-good—f a4-th—wjrth—respect^-to—wage-s-,-^hours^—and—o tfaer^terms—and' 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 22, 199 0 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
ic /. Schmertz, Member I 
#3B-2/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3569 
TOWN OF PERTH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time highway employees. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-3569 
- 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
-"ti^ es^ annd; ©^nf:er-;i;±n^  
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: February 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#302/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SMITHTOWN ADMINISTRATORS GUILD, 
Petitioner, 
- - -—^—-and^—-— — — _-eAS:E-N-Q-^-C^35-7-5— 
TOWN OF SMITHTOWN, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, 




CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Smithtown Administrators 
Guild has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
J 
Certification - C-3575 
- 2 -
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Administrator I, Parks Department; Supervisor, 
Animal Shelter; Town Assessor; Assistant 
Director of Facilities Mgmt., Parks Department; 
Deputy Town Assessor; Assistant Town Director 
— — of—Pl-anni-ng;—Assistant—Town—Engineer;—Sendor—^^ 
Citizen Program Supervisor; Chief Building 
Inspector; Deputy Town Clerk I; Deputy Town 
Clerk II; Director of Env. & Waterways; 
Director of Facilities Management; Drug and 
Alcohol Coordinator, Horizons Director; 
Planning Director; Sanitation Supervisor; 
Senior Citizen Program Director; Superintendent 
of Recreation II; Town Engineer; Director of 
Traffic Safety-Traffic Engineer III; Water 
District Supervisor; Youth Bureau Director; 
Town Investigator; Director Code Enforcement; 
Chief Fire Inspector; Deputy Tax Receiver; 
Deputy Town Clerk III; Highway Engineer; 
Ordinance Inspector/Town Investigator; Senior 
Civil Engineer; Senior Planner (Assistant 
Planning Administrator); Senior Planner 
(Planning Administrator); Senior Planner 
(Community Development Director); Town Park 
Superintendent. 
Excluded: Assistant Town Attorney; Comptroller; Data 
Processing Supervisor; Deputy Superintendent of 
Highways; Legislative Secretary; Personnel 
Director; Personnel Officer; Systems Analyst; 
Town Attorney; Town Supervisor's Secretary. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Smithtown Administrators 
Guild. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
! incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Certification - C-3575 - 3 -
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
R h[oZ, /g-uy^u a^]A. 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
luOc^X: 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
